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1Introduction
Introduction
The end of 2019 and beginning of 2020 witnessed 
two terrorist attacks in London carried out by released 
terrorist prisoners. In November 2019, Usman Khan 
attacked and killed two people and injured three others 
before being shot dead by police officers. Khan had spent 
eight years in prison after being convicted for planning 
terrorist attacks and had been released in December 
2018. Just over two months later in February 2020, 
another released prisoner, Sudesh Amman, injured two 
people in an attack in south London, before he too was 
shot dead by police officers who had him under close 
surveillance. Amman had been released from prison just 
ten days before he carried out the attack. 
The two attacks starkly illustrate the potential dangers 
posed by released terrorist prisoners. In the UK, the 
attacks fuelled a wider debate about risk assessment, 
de-radicalisation and the impact of prison on terrorists. 
The UK government response to the killings was to 
rush through the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early 
Release) Act which was made law in February 2020. This 
increased the amount of time such prisoners would be 
kept in prison compared to other offenders. Both Khan 
and Amman had been automatically released at the 
half-way stage of their sentences. The new legislation 
means that other terrorist prisoners will not now be 
considered for release until the two-third point of their 
sentence at the earliest, and release at that stage would 
be dependent on the decision of a parole board. 
The cases highlighted issues around the risk of re-
offending posed by former terrorist prisoners, what 
are appropriate processes and systems for managing 
and risk assessing such individuals, and to what extent 
is rehabilitation possible in the context of terrorist 
offending? This paper will explore these and related 
issues to help inform wider discussion and debates 
on appropriate policy in this area. In order to gain a 
balanced understanding of terrorist recidivism the 
paper starts by critically analysing what we actually 
mean when we talk about ‘recidivism.’ This discussion 
will demonstrate the need for a concrete operational 
definition before one is able to truly analyse recidivist 
activity. This is followed by the discussion of terrorist 
recidivism in a range of international contexts, ranging 
from Northern Ireland to Sri Lanka, the United States to 
Israel. By taking this broader perspective it allows the 
reader to gain a greater understanding of what factors 
related to recidivism rates may be context-specific, and 
which are universal. 
What is recidivism? And 
what is it not?
Before any critical analysis of recidivism research can 
take place, it needs to first clearly outline what the 
concept of recidivism refers to, and perhaps more 
1 Howard, P. and Dixon, L. (2011). Developing an Empirical Classification of Violent Offences for Use in the Prediction of Recidivism in England and Wales. Journal of 
Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research, pp. 141-154.
importantly, what it does not. This is an issue which is 
at times ignored by those utilising recidivism statistics, 
especially those doing so to promote the successes 
of their own rehabilitation programmes. It is clear 
from the literature that, as with terrorism, there is no 
universally accepted or utilised operational definition 
of recidivism. At a fundamental level, recidivism 
constitutes the continuation of, or return to, a previous 
pattern of criminal behaviour. Specifically, this refers to 
new criminal activity by an individual after a previous 
criminal conviction which resulted in imprisonment or 
another form of legal sanction. However, there is not a 
universal acceptance as to what sanctions are included 
when measuring recidivism, both for the first and the 
subsequent offences. Some recidivism studies and 
reports only refer to criminal convictions which involve a 
prison sentence, whereas others also include technical 
violations such as an individual’s failure to report to a 
parole officer.
  
Across academic studies and penal reports, there is a 
noted variation in the timeline by which recidivism is 
measured. Generally speaking, recidivism studies focus 
on re-arrest, between three and five years after the 
release from custody or the date of sanction. However, 
there are studies whose focus is on a shorter time 
period. For example, Howard and Dixon looked at re-
offending within a 24-month follow-up period from the 
date of index community sentencing or release from 
custody resulting in a caution or conviction within this 
time-frame or an additional twelve months.1 The study 
of recidivism often has less to do with an analysis of an 
individual’s tendency to re-offend, but is utilised more 
as an assessment of the suitability and success of 
specific forms of punishment or intervention in terms of 
rehabilitation. As a result of this focus on penology, or the 
study of criminal punishments and prison management, 
these set time-lines have restricted the full scope of the 
findings. Consequently, there has traditionally been a 
disregard of the roles which society and the external 
community can and do play in recidivism. Therefore, 
prior to comparing recidivism rates one must first be 
aware of the possible discrepancies in measurement 
across studies.  
If one is to take China and the US as two comparative 
case studies, the variations in definition become 
apparent. The Chinese judiciary have two separate forms 
of recidivism, and consequently two separate ways of 
dealing with recidivist behaviour. These are ‘general 
recidivism’ and ‘recidivism of crimes endangering 
national security.’ This is covered under Article 65 of 
the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China. With 
respect to ‘general recidivism’ there are three criteria 
which must be met. These are:
1. The intentionality of the first and subsequent crimes.
2. The punishments for the first and subsequent crimes 
must be fixed-term imprisonment or a heavier 
penalty.
3. The subsequent crime must be committed within 
five years of serving the first sentence or receiving 
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a pardon. 
For ‘recidivism of crimes endangering national security,’ 
there are significant differences to ‘general recidivism.’ 
Both the initial and subsequent crimes must be judicially 
defined as a crime which endangers national security. 
There is not the same necessity to prove intentionality 
as there is with respect to ‘general recidivism.’ In relation 
to the timeframe of re-conviction the subsequent 
offences can occur any time after the initial conviction, 
and therefore is not restricted by the same five-year time 
limit as general recidivism. However, while these are the 
legal definitions of Chinese recidivism, in practice it is 
admitted that recidivism refers to ‘committing crimes 
frequently’ and it does not require specific forms of 
crime, types of punishment, or length of time between 
illegal actions to be defined as such.  
Within the US, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which 
measures recidivism rates nationally and publishes a 
series of reports, has only one definition of recidivism. 
They measure recidivism “…by criminal acts that resulted 
in the rearrest, reconviction, or return to prison with 
or without a new sentence during a three-year period 
following the prisoner’s release.” 
When compared to the two separate Chinese definitions, 
there are obvious differences, which in turn affects 
measurement and the resultant recidivism statistics. 
Within the Chinese definitions, recidivism must include 
at minimum a fixed term prison sentence. However, the 
US interpretation includes  ‘rearrest, reconviction, or 
return to prison with or without a new sentence’. This 
broadens the scope of what is measured within the 
US and therefore one would expect there to be higher 
rates of recidivism in comparison to the Chinese figures. 
The time periods in the Chinese definitions are longer 
compared to the US, up to five years after the completion 
of the initial prison sentence for general offences, and 
open-ended for national security recidivism which could 
potentially increase the Chinese statistics. Further, the 
Chinese definition refers to the issue of intent, whereas 
the US operational definition does not acknowledge 
intent at any stage. Consequently, the US recidivism 
rates will be expected to include those crimes which can 
be defined as unintentional illegal actions.      
When making cross-national statistical comparisons it 
is also important to be aware of the social construction 
of crime. Criminal law is reliant on political, cultural and 
social society in which it is developed. Therefore, when 
assessing, and comparing criminal statistics one must 
be aware of exactly what is defined as a crime in each 
particular case. This is not only relevant in geographical 
comparisons but also within an individual geographical 
area when statistics are being compared across time. 
With the constant evolution of criminal law, what 
constitutes a crime today was not necessarily always 
considered as such. This places further emphasis on the 
importance of a clear definition of the specific acts or 
2 https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Lords/2020-01-27/HL782/
3 For example see: Horgan, J. and Braddock, K., 2010. Rehabilitating the terrorists? Challenges in assessing the effectiveness of de-radicalization programs. Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 22(2), pp. 267-291; Silke, A. (2011). ‘Disengagement or Deradicalization: A Look at Prison Programs for Jailed Terrorists.’  CTC Sentinel, 4/1, pp.18-21; Silke, 
A. (2014) Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform. London: Routledge.
omissions which are to be included in any analysis of 
criminal recidivism.
With all these issues considered, it becomes apparent 
that while the conceptual definition may be quite 
straightforward, the operational definition (the one 
which directs measurement) is not as clear. These 
issues highlight that it is the operational, rather than the 
conceptual, definition of recidivism which one must be 
aware of when analysing, interpreting and comparing 
recidivism findings.  
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Following the two attacks by former prisoners in London, 
the UK government subsequently released statistics on 
re-offending by terrorist prisoners. In England and Wales, 
for the period between January 2013 and December 
2019, 196 terrorist prisoners were released. In the same 
time period, six of these were subsequently convicted for 
another terrorism-related offence giving a re-offending 
rate of 3 percent.2 This re-offending figure rises to 3.6 
percent if we include Usman Khan, who was killed by 
police officers during his attack. These statistics do not 
include prisoners who were convicted of non-terrorism-
related offences subsequent to release, though this 
figure is also believed to be low.
The low rate of reconviction may come as a surprise to 
many, but statistics on re-offending by released terrorist 
prisoners have in general found that they have low rates 
and indeed are typically far lower than the reconviction 
rates seen with other types of offenders. This applies 
both to general re-offending (i.e. not politically 
motivated) as well as terrorism-related offending. Most 
earlier reviews report re-offending rates of between 2 
- 15 percent depending on the samples and contexts,3 
levels which are far lower than those seen for “ordinary” 
non-political offenders.
It is worth looking at a number of case studies in more 
detail to provide context to these figures. For example, 
in Northern Ireland, as part of the Good Friday Peace 
Agreement in 1998, 453 paramilitary prisoners were 
released. By 2011, just 23 of these prisoners had been 
recalled to custody (5 percent). Of these 23, just ten were 
recalled for alleged involvement in further terrorism-
related offences (2.2 percent) with the remainder being 
recalled for other criminal activity. 
3Terrorist recidivism
Another example worth considering is provided by Sri 
Lanka, where a significant terrorist threat was posed by 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). After decades 
of conflict, the LTTE were comprehensively defeated in 
2009. Following this, the government maintained a very 
strong military presence in areas previously under LTTE 
control with a focus on preventing the re-emergence of 
pro-LTTE groups. Approximately 12,000 LTTE members 
were captured in 2009. The Sri Lankan government 
introduced a large-scale programme to rehabilitate 
these prisoners. 11,000 of these prisoners were released 
by the end of 2011 and most of the rest by 2014. In 2015, 
there were approximately 270 prisoners being held in Sri 
Lankan prisons mainly under the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act (PTA) for alleged links to the LTTE, and about 100 
of these prisoners had been part of the original 12,000, 
indicating a potentially less than 1 percent re-offending 
rate.4 
Taken together, both the Northern Ireland and the Sri 
Lankan cases indicate that re-offending in a context 
where the linked conflict has largely ended is very low. 
Northern Ireland provides evidence that re-offending 
by terror convicts is very low not just for politically-
motivated crimes, but also for “ordinary” general crimes. 
What then does the evidence say about re-offending 
rates for prisoners where the linked conflict to their cause 
is still on-going and may even be intensifying? There is 
evidence available on a range of relevant conflicts to 
help shed light on this. For example, the re-offending 
rates of released terrorist prisoners in Saudi Arabia has 
attracted particular attention over the last fifteen years. In 
December 2011, Saudi officials overseeing the country’s 
prison-based de-radicalisation programmes reported 
that of more than 5,000 terrorist prisoners who had 
participated in some aspect of the program and been 
released, an estimated 2 – 20 percent had re-offended 
after release.5 There have been long-running issues 
over the reliability of the Saudi figures – particularly 
with regard to initial claims of a 0 percent re-offending 
rate, but the more recent figures are considered more 
4 A. Kruglanski, M. Gelfand, J. Bélanger, R. Gunaratna and M. Hetiarachchi, (2014). ‘De-radicalising the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’, in A. Silke (ed.) Prisons, 
Terrorism & Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform. Oxon: Routledge
5 The variation in these numbers is due to fluctuating assessments provided by the Saudi authorities themselves and the rationale and metrics behind those assessments 
are often not clear. For a good discussion on the context of the Saudi case and the various estimates see Porges, M. (2014). ‘Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Approach to Terrorist 
Prisoners: A Model for Others?’ in A. Silke (ed.) Prisons, Terrorism & Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform. Oxon: Routledge.
6 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2017). Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
7 New America Foundation (2014), Appendix: How Dangerous are Freed Guantanamo Prisoners?, by Peter Bergen and Bailey Cahall, June 5, 2014. Available at: http://
newamerica.net/publications/resources/2014/how_many_guantanamo_detainees_return_to_the_battlefield
8 Swann, S. (2017). Who are the Guantanamo Brits? BBC News Online.
realistic.
The Saudi figures are also comparable with the re-
offending rates reported for released Guantanamo Bay 
detainees. As of January 2017, of the 714 Guantanamo 
detainees who had been released since the prison 
opened in 2002, 121 had been confirmed as having 
re-engaged in violent extremism (16.9 percent).6 12.2 
percent were suspected of having reengaged, though the 
category of “suspected” could be reached on the basis 
of superficial evidence, such as unverified information 
or potentially just one source claiming the individual 
had reengaged. Indeed, a separate independent 
review of the released detainees in June 2014, when 
there had been 640 released detainees, used stricter 
criteria to assess if individuals had re-engaged or not, 
and assessed that only 54 detainees were confirmed 
or suspected of having re-engaged, a maximum re-
offending rate of 8.4 percent.7 This second figure is also 
consistent with the re-engaged rate for released British 
detainees at Guantanamo. Of the 17 British detainees, 
just one re-engaged in violent extremism.8 
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Two recent studies have looked at re-offending rates 
for terrorist prisoners in the US. In a study focused 
on prisoners connected to Islamist terrorism, Wright 
(2019) identified 31 prisoners who had been released 
between January 1990 and the end of May 2019.9 Four 
of these prisoners re-offended (13 percent) during this 
time period. Drawing on a larger sample of released 
terrorism prisoners released in the US between 2001 and 
2018, Hodwitz (2019) reported that just four of the 247 
released prisoners recidivated during that time period, a 
recidivism rate of just 1.6 percent.10 This sample included 
prisoners with a wide mix of affiliations and ideological 
backgrounds, and not just those connected to Islamist 
extremism.11 The recidivism events all occurred within 
three years of release and were a mix of offences 
ranging from drug possession, fraud, forgery and using 
the internet (which was a plea agreement violation in that 
case). In two cases, the sanctions applied in response 
were minor (90 days detention or less), suggesting the 
offences in those cases were not seen as serious. 
Returning to a European context, a recent Dutch study 
examined the outcomes for 189 individuals supervised 
by ‘team TER’ (Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalization) 
9 Wright, C. (2019). ‘An Examination of Jihadi Recidivism Rates in the United States.’ CTC Sentinel, 12/10, pp.26-31.
10 Hodwitz, O., 2019. The Terrorism Recidivism Study (TRS). Perspectives on Terrorism, 13(2), pp.54-64.
11 Based on descriptions of the cases provided in the two articles it is worth noting that the four who re-offended in Hodwitz’s sample do not seem to be an exact match for 
the four who re-offended in Wright’s sample. 
12 van der Heide, L. and Schuurman, B. (2018). ‘Reintegrating Terrorists in the Netherlands: Evaluating the Dutch approach.’ Journal for Deradicalization, 19, pp.196-239.
13 Renard, T. (2020). ‘Overblown: Exploring the Gap Between the Fear of Terrorist Recidivism and the Evidence.’ CTC Sentinel, April, 1-11.
within the Dutch Probation Service between 2012 and 
2018.12 This study found that just eleven re-offended, 
eight for terrorism-related offences and three for non-
terrorism re-offending. This gave a re-offending rate of 
5.8 percent in total over the time period, compared to 
the 45-56 percent rates which were average for other 
types of offenders dealt with by the probation service.  
Recent research on released prisoners in Belgium also 
paints a similar picture, finding that of 557 jihadi-related 
prisoners between 1990 and 2019 just thirteen (2.3 
percent) recidivated.13 This figure rose to 4.8 percent 
when suspected re-engagement in terrorist activity was 
included. Interestingly, the Belgium research found that 
the majority of the re-offending happened within the 
first nine months of release, with only three released 
prisoners re-offending at a later stage.
The one notable exception to the general finding that 
terrorist prisoners appear to have lower than average 
re-offending rates comes from Israel. A recent study 
there found that ‘security prisoners’ — as terrorism and 
political violence-related prisoners are referred to within 
the Israeli prison system — had a very high five year 
5Why is re-offending lower for released terrorist prisoners?
recidivism rate of 60.2 percent.14 This is considerably 
higher than the rate of 41.3 percent for other types of 
Israeli prisoners, and far higher than the rates we have 
seen for all of the other countries considered. The Israeli 
study used data on 1517 security prisoners who had 
been held by the Israeli Prison Service at some stage 
between 2004 and 2017.   
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there are questions over how 
comparable this Israeli sample is with the standard 
terrorism-related prisoner populations typically found 
in the West. For example, the mean sentence length 
served by the Israeli sample was just 32 weeks before 
release, and a proportion of the sample (not specified by 
the researchers) had an incarceration length of less than 
a week. Further some of the sample (again not specified) 
had not been convicted of an offence at the time of 
release. The study also reported that re-incarcerated 
prisoners also served a mean of just 32 weeks before 
release, with again an unspecified proportion having a 
re-incarceration period of less than a week. 
The very short mean length of time in prison for both first-
time and then again for the re-offenders, combined with 
uncertainty over exactly how many had actually been 
convicted, suggests that some very unusual dynamics 
are happening with this prisoner population. It is possible, 
for example, that a substantial proportion of the sample 
may have been rioters or street protestors. Very few 
terrorism-related prisoners in the West serve sentences 
of 32 weeks or less before release. No country in the 
West has a criminal justice profile showing 50 percent of 
their terrorist prisoners being released after such short 
sentences. It is questionable whether any individuals in 
the West who spent less than a week in prison before 
release would, under a realistic measure, be considered 
a released terrorist prisoner. As a result, it would be 
quite unwise to place too much reliance on the Israeli 
findings until there is greater clarity around the prisoner 
population involved, the nature of their offences and 
convictions, and why such a high proportion appear to 
have served very short sentences. 
Why is re-offending lower 
for released terrorist 
prisoners?
This is a question that would benefit from more 
research.15 A variety of factors probably combine to 
explain why re-offending rates for released terrorists are 
lower than for other violent offenders. At an initial level, 
lower re-offending rates could be partly linked to closer 
monitoring and supervision of terrorist offenders on 
14 Hasisi, B., Carmel, T., Weisburd, D. and Wolfowicz, M. (2019). ‘Crime and Terror: Examining Criminal Risk Factors for Terrorist Recidivism.’ Journal of Quantitative 
Criminology
15 Silke, A., & Veldhuis, T. (2017). Countering violent extremism in prisons: A review of key recent research and critical research gaps. Perspectives on terrorism, 11(5), 2-11.
16 Wilkinson, B. (2014). "Do Leopards Change Their Spots?: Probation, risk assessment and management of terrorism-related offenders on licence in the UK." In A. Silke 
(ed.), Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism. Routledge, 259-269; Marsden, S. V. (2016). Reintegrating extremists: Deradicalisation and desistance. Springer.
17 Bryant, S., Peck, M. & Lovbakke, J. (2015). Reoffending Analysis of MAPPA Eligible Offenders. Ministry of Justice. 
18 See for example Alonso, R. (2006). ‘Individual Motivations for Joining Terrorist Organizations: a Comparative Qualitative Studies on Members of ETA and IRA.’ In Victorff, 
J. (Ed.) Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism, 187-202. (Amsterdam: IOS Press) 
19 McCauley, C. & Moskalenko, S. (2008). ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism’ Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(3), 415-433; Khalil, J., 
Horgan, J., & Zeuthen, M. (2019). ‘The Attitudes-Behaviors Corrective (ABC) Model of Violent Extremism.’  Terrorism and Political Violence.
release from prison compared to the attention focused 
on non-terrorist prisoners. In the context of England, 
Wales and Scotland, terrorist prisoners are managed 
under Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements 
(MAPPA).16 MAPPAs were established in 2001 and 
were initially focused on improving the monitoring and 
management of convicted sexual and violent offenders. 
Such offenders continue to be the dominant population 
dealt with by MAPPA, but terrorism-related prisoners are 
also handled under the programme. MAPPA involves 
probation offices, prison services, police, and other 
stakeholders working closely together to assess and 
manage the released prisoner. Released prisoners will 
have licence conditions set which typically can include 
wearing a tag, curfews, restrictions on where they can 
go, who they can meet with, on internet use, on mobile 
phone use, or other similar restrictions. Breaching 
conditions can lead to being recalled to prison. The 
conditions are monitored and can be relaxed or made 
stricter depending on the assessments of the staff 
involved. In the context of terrorist offenders, some 
released prisoners will also be required/encouraged 
to take part in disengagement and de-radicalisation 
work. This can take a range of approaches, including 
participation in a formal programme and/or working with 
a specialist mentor. Thus, lower re-offending rates may 
be partly down to the positive effects of MAPPA and 
similar arrangements in other jurisdictions. 
Certainly, there is evidence that MAPPA is associated 
with reduced levels of re-offending for sexual offenders 
and non-terrorist violent offenders. However, the re-
offending levels reported are still significantly higher 
than the levels seen for terrorism-related offenders 
(e.g. a re-offending rate of 13 percent for serious sex 
offenders within one year of release compared to just 
3 percent for terrorists over a much longer time-frame). 
17 This suggests that other factors beyond specialist 
management play a role in the lower re-offending rates 
seen with terrorist prisoners.
One of these other factors is the role of political 
motivation in the offences. This is a distinctive feature of 
terrorist offending and differentiates it from other violent 
offences. A wide body of research has highlighted that 
for many perpetrators, terrorism is seen as a means 
to achieving broader political goals, unlike the goals 
of many other crimes.18 This is not to disregard those 
who partake in terrorism for reasons other than political 
ideas.19 Those partaking in terrorism are more likely to 
have a self-perception of altruism than criminals. Risk 
assessment tools designed specifically for use with 
terrorism-related offenders usually consider this as a 
factor. For example, the Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG) 
risk assessment tool developed for use in prisons in 
England and Wales specifically recognises that political 
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context is “a unique feature of extremist offending.”20 
This unique feature helps explain why involvement in 
crime or violence is not then a feature of post-release 
life for most former terrorist prisoners.
The final factor could be that terrorists are generally 
psychologically and socially different from other offenders 
and that these differences reduce the likelihood of re-
offending on release. For example, psychiatric factors 
are less common in terrorists than in other violent 
criminals. Despite the indiscriminate and extreme 
violence of many terrorist attacks, the vast majority of 
psychiatric research on terrorists has concluded that the 
majority are not psychologically abnormal and that there 
is no distinct terrorist personality.21 On the contrary, many 
studies have found that terrorists are psychologically 
healthier and more stable than other violent criminals. 
This finding applies particularly strongly to group-based 
terrorists, such as members of the IRA and ETA. In 
contrast, there is a higher incidence of mental health 
issues among lone-actor terrorists, though even in the 
case of lone actors, this does not apply to the majority.22 
Particularly relevant evidence in this regard comes 
from Lyons and Harbinson’s review of the Northern 
Ireland prison population in the 1980s.23 They compared 
terrorist murderers with non-political murderers. The 
authors found that the politically motivated killers 
were generally more stable, showed a lower incidence 
of mental illness, and came from more stable family 
backgrounds than their non-political counterparts. This 
work gains in significance when one realises the bias 
which existed in the sample. While representative of 
the non-political murderers, the sample was skewed for 
the political murderers. In Northern Ireland, murderers 
are routinely sent for psychiatric assessment, unless 
the killers are terrorists. Consequently, the vast majority 
of terrorists were never psychiatrically assessed. The 
only ones included in Lyons and Harbinson’s study 
are those terrorists whose behaviour in custody was 
so abnormal that the authorities felt motivated to have 
them assessed. The majority of ‘normal’ terrorists were 
thus never included. Even so, the ‘abnormal’ terrorists 
still emerged as more normal and more mentally stable 
than the average non-political murderer.
The study found that 16 percent of the terrorists were 
mentally ill, but the researchers noted that this 16 
percent was composed mainly of individuals: 
“who seemed to be operating on the fringe of a para-
military organisation and who were devoid of discipline. 
They killed in a most sadistic way while heavily 
intoxicated. This small group was by no means typical 
of the rest and raised the figures for those [political 
murderers] under the influence of alcohol. It included 
three who used a knife, which is a very rare method of 
political killing.”24 
20 Lloyd, M., & Dean, C. (2015). The development of structured guidelines for assessing risk in extremist offenders. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2(1), 
40-52.
21 See for example Borum, R. (2014). ‘Psychological vulnerabilities and propensities for involvement in violent extremism’, Behavioral Sciences & the Law, Vol.32, No.3, 
pp.286-305.
22 See in particular Corner, E. and Gill, P. (2015) “A False Dichotomy? Lone Actor Terrorism and Mental Illness”. Law and Human Behavior 39(1):23-34; and, Corner, E., Gill, 
P. and Mason, O. (2016) “Mental Health Disorders and the Terrorist: A Research Note Probing Selection Effects and Disorder Prevalence”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
39(6): 560-568
23 Lyons, H.A. and Harbinson, H.J. (1986). A comparison of political and non-political murderers in Northern Ireland, 1974-84. Medicine, Science and the Law 26, 193-198.
24 Ibid., p.197
Even so, an incidence among this sub-group of only 16 
percent is incredibly low, especially when compared 
with an incidence of 58 percent seen among the non-
political offenders.
Conclusions
Overall, the available evidence strongly suggests that 
re-offending rates for released terrorist prisoners is 
surprisingly low. In most countries, terrorist re-offending 
rates are much lower than the levels typically seen with 
ordinary, non-terrorist prisoners. This trend applies both 
in the context of releases where the related conflict 
is still ongoing, and where the conflict has ended or 
entered a significant peace process. 
It is important to acknowledge, however, that some re-
offending does occur, though the level of re-offending is 
typically much lower than we would normally expect with 
most released prisoners. Monitoring and management 
systems should be in place for released prisoners. 
For those looking for inspiration, the MAPPA system 
developed in the UK represents one good model to 
examine which offers some innovative features.
In thinking about further steps, one obvious area for 
attention is to try to better educate and inform both the 
policy worlds and the wider public about the general 
risk posed by released terrorist prisoners. This risk is not 
zero, but contrary to expectation, most released terrorists 
disengage from violent extremism. Those who re-offend 
are a minority. Any future analysis attempting to assess 
the risk factors of recidivism in terrorist offenders needs 
to be very cautious in its analysis and any implications 
drawn from this. This is due the relatively small sample 
from which this analysis could be developed, and the 
discrepancy in relation to the operational definitions 
on which different data sources are based. Similarly if 
research is to assess re-offending of returning foreign 
terrorist fighters we would advise caution in comparing 
to released terrorist prisoners, as different dynamics are 
in play in these contrasting populations.
Going forward, in general we need to be more 
sophisticated and more critical in our thinking about 
prisons as hot-beds for radicalisation. Compared to other 
types of offenders, prison seems generally to “work” 
for disengaging most terrorists from their past criminal 
activities. While countries are increasingly recognising 
disengagement is not the same as de-radicalisation, it is 
arguably an important and a more useful measure. 
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